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Storm Clouds: The “Warning Signs” Fallacy 
“Truly, officer, because he hath some offenses in him that thou wouldst discover if thou 
couldst, let him continue in his courses till thou know’st what they are”—Measure for 
Measure 
 
 
Soon after Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan shot to death 13 and injured many more at 
Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009, reporters and commentators began to wonder 
aloud whether warning signs of the homicidal outburst had been ignored.  “Officials may 
not have heeded warning signs,” declared a headline in the Washington Post of Nov. 7.  
According to an article in the New York Times on Nov. 9, the FBI and the Army may be 
guilty of “missing possible warning signs that might have stopped a mass killing.”  
Whether or not such a massacre was predictable, the retrospective invocation of 
warning signs seems to take place regularly—predictably—in the aftermath of mass 
murder.  Within a day of the massacre at Virginia Tech in April 2007, CBS News already 
had an article on its website headlined, “Warning Signs from Student Gunman.”  
Appended to the report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel, likewise, is “a list of red flags, 
warning signs and indicators.”  It is as if the ritual repetition of a phrase served to buffer 
the shock of events.  However, the notion that shocking events are preceded by legible 
warnings, and could therefore have been prevented if only the warnings were heeded, 
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obscures the self-evident truth that it is easier to predict events after they have 
occurred.  
Regardless of the language that sprang up seemingly automatically in the press 
in the immediate aftermath of Fort Hood, those events too yielded warning signs only in 
retrospect.  After the fact it came out that Hasan was known to American surveillance to 
be in communication with an anti-American cleric in Yemen, yet “there was no 
indication that Major Hasan was planning an imminent attack at all.”1  The ominous 
import that his exchanges with the cleric seemed to possess in retrospect escaped 
intelligence analysts in real time.  Surely even those who think Hasan’s actions might 
have been prevented would have been reluctant at the time to charge him with 
conspiracy to commit mass murder on the strength of messages that furnished no 
evidence of any such thing. 
Where, then, does the belief in warning signs come from?  The term itself recalls 
the belief that “the warning signs of cancer” provide our best defense against the 
disease, a doctrine already well established when a succession of school shootings in the 
1990s, culminating in the Columbine massacre of 1999, provoked public reflection on 
their causes and the possibility of prevention.  Because no cure of cancer materialized 
despite the war on cancer declared by President Nixon in 1971, the only recourse 
seemed to be early treatment, which in turn demands early detection.  The discourse 
and even, to some extent, the machinery of detection were already in place when the 
mass murders first in high schools, then Virginia Tech, and lately at Fort Hood began to 
form a kind of genre in our common experience.  Given the widely held and seemingly 
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intuitive notion that society itself can suffer from illness, the application of a cancer 
metaphor to this social problem seemed all the more apt. 
 In that medical warning signs are more definite than behavioral signals of 
impending events, the cancer analogy works to the advantage of those concerned to 
prevent violence by rooting it out in its early stages.  But this isn’t to say that “the 
warning signs of cancer” pose no interpretive quandaries.  Considering that the search 
for early cancer is less epistemologically open-ended than the interpretation of 
behavioral signals, it’s noteworthy that in the case of some cancers we tend to find what 
we seek, and that the cancers thus detected are of uncertain significance.  Because a 
protein associated with prostate cancer can be detected by a blood test, the disease has 
lent itself to a population-wide program of prevention, with the result that by 2005 well 
over a million men had already been treated with surgery or radiation for cancer 
without clinical significance.2  Even if the presence of cancer is confirmed under the 
microscope, its significance is by no means a settled question in many cases.  That 
medicine cannot reliably distinguish clinically insignificant from dangerous cancer of the 
prostate, and that screening has therefore led to massive overdiagnosis and 
overtreatment of the disease over the last twenty years are openly conceded in the 
medical literature.  The more rigorous the hunt for the early signs of prostate cancer the 
more of it is detected, to the point that fully 25% of the placebo group in the Prostate 
Cancer Prevention Trial, a low-risk population, was diagnosed with prostate cancer (this 
even as mortality from the disease stands at about 3% of the male population).3  That 
the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force declines to recommend PSA testing, and has 
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lately recommended against mammography for women at age 40, suggests that the 
search for incipient cancer has costs.  Yet there is more science behind it than behind 
the search for the theoretical early signs of homicidal violence.  If we were to screen the 
population for warning signs of the latter as actively as we screen for early-stage cancer, 
the result would be massive signal-distortion, with the complication that cancer is a 
disease and a tendency to violence isn’t.  
 In part, the trouble lies in the very concept of a behavioral warning of an 
impending event.  Compounding the uncertainty of behavioral signals as such with 
reference to an as-yet nonexistent occurrence, such a sign seems doubly uncertain.  
Virtually by definition, it’s easy to miss the import of a behavioral signal directing our 
gaze to something that hasn’t yet taken place.  However, it’s also very possible to make 
something of nothing—to convert a datum into a warning sign by reading ominous 
import into it that it doesn’t really possess or warrant.  The concept of a warning sign is 
pregnant with false negatives and false positives. 
Say that a youth who turns a gun on his fellow students is discovered to have 
liked a song that exalts killing.  In retrospect the association seems significant, though it 
real time no one read anything into it, and in any case it would have been impossible to 
predict so terrible an outcome on the strength of such tenuous evidence (even 
buttressed by other evidence of the same kind).  Was his affection for the song a sign?  
How could it have been recognized as such?  How, on the basis of evidence as slender as 
this, would it be possible to justify the sort of pre-emptive intervention that believers in 
warning signs seem to have in mind? 
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Following a succession of school shootings but before the massacre at Virginia 
Tech, the Secret Service Interim Report on the Prevention of Targeted Violence in 
Schools cautioned that “Knowing that an individual shares characteristics, features, or 
traits with prior school shooters does not advance the appraisal of risk.  The use of 
profiles carries a risk of overidentification, and the vast majority of students who fit any 
given profile will not actually pose a risk.”  To classify students as potential shooters 
because they happen to resemble other shooters is to abuse evidence and to institute a 
sort of interpretive presumption of guilt in the name of prevention.  When CBS News, 
but one day after the bloodshed at Virginia Tech, pointed to the perpetrator’s “violent 
writings” and “loner status” as fitting “the Secret Service profile” of a school shooter, it 
did exactly what the Secret Service cautioned against.  Such a search for resemblances 
will yield not only a flood of false positives but also, ironically, the likelihood of false 
negatives.  The Secret Service report continues, “The use of . . . stereotypes will fail to 
identify some students who do, in fact, pose a risk of violence, but who share few 
characteristics with prior attackers.”4  Any checklist of psychological signals we might 
care to draw up—depression, anger, interest in guns, fantasies of violence, thoughts of 
suicide, “loner status”—will yield multitudes of false suspects, even as others slip 
through the net by not conforming to type. 
Not only is the concept of a sign pointing to a future event uncertain in itself, but 
to search for signs with strong emotive preconceptions about their character and import 
is to make findings still more dubious.  In a hunt for signs of violent acts that haven’t yet 
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occurred, plenty of evidence would be uncovered, no doubt —but evidence of what?  It 
has been said of jealousy that it  
 
comprises a powerful desire to know along with a distorted sense of evidence—
curiosity combined with credulity.  The jealous man, suspecting his wife of 
infidelity, becomes epistemologically voracious—he must know; hence the 
interrogations, the spying, the private detectives even. . . . But instead of the 
desire to know being accompanied by high standards of evidence and reasoning, 
the jealous man turns into an epistemological nincompoop.5   
 
Somewhat similarly, the hunt for warning signs would in all likelihood turn up evidence 
of the hunter’s own fears and preconceptions, in this case reinforced by the theories 
and findings of others.  Not only are warning signs subject to interpretation (and 
“possible warning signs” doubly so), but to search them out is to bend the ambiguity of 
the evidence into the service of our own foregone conclusions.  Those on an interpretive 
mission tend to find what they seek.  Freudians discover Freudian material.  When 
journalists search after the fact for warning signs of an event, they find them.  The 
hermeneutics of alarm would not fail to uncover alarming signs. 
 The traps besetting the notion of a behavioral warning sign (and all the more the 
hunt for such signs) seem to trace back to the belief that the future reveals itself in the 
present.  According to the common conception, this is just what happens in a work of 
literature—the outcome shows itself symbolically before it occurs, in the form of 
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foreshadowing.  “Let us suppose that a character is happy, confident of the future, and 
celebrating a victory that promises still greater success,” writes Gary Saul Morson in a 
superb study of narrative. 
 
Obstacles are melting ever faster.  But although he does not know it, a 
thunderstorm, which the author describes in some detail, is approaching.  Even if 
the hero did know of the storm, it would indicate to him nothing more than rain; 
but the reader recognizes it as foreshadowing, a sign of a reversal of fortune. . . .  
 
The storm happens because something else is going to happen.  It is caused by 
subsequent events, and that is why it is an instance of foreshadowing. . . The 
causation, so to speak, works backward.6  
 
If something like this literary model informs the popular notion of warning signs—and 
we do tend to call events like the mass murders at Columbine, Virginia Tech and Fort 
Hood tragedies, perhaps for lack of a better term—a few comments are in order.  First, 
there’s no such thing as reverse causality, as Morson emphasizes.  Second, signs are 
usually less portentous than turmoil in the heavens.  Third, even in works of literature 
with their heightened patterns and lack of randomness, the significance of 
foreshadowing usually dawns on us only belatedly.  So too in life.  A section of the 
Review Panel’s report on the Virginia Tech massacre is entitled “Storm Clouds 
Gathering, Fall 2005.” 
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If and only if Hasan were like a time-bomb would the murderous outcome of his 
history have been given in advance.  But the metaphor of the time-bomb is too 
mechanistic, the path from present to future implied in its terms too linear and too 
determined, to apply readily to human life.7  
 
* 
 
Some would say, however, that there are specialists among us uniquely qualified 
to discern and evaluate warning signs of violence.  When the press holds out the hope 
of averting acts of violence by the timely interpretation of signs, it usually means the 
interpretation of signs by psychologists.  Exactly what has inspired this investment of 
hope and trust is hard to say—certainly not the profession’s success record.  In point of 
fact, “there are no accurate methods of discriminating those who will go on to develop a 
bona fide mental disorder from those who do not,”8 and psychological experts have a 
notably poor prediction record.9  In an amicus brief filed in a capital case some thirty 
years ago, the American Psychiatric Association itself declared that “even under the best 
of conditions, psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are wrong in at least two 
out of every three cases.”10 
 
By the nature of things, it’s all but impossible to document a case where 
someone who would eventually have gone on to commit a massacre was kept from 
doing so, while on the other hand we know of persons under psychological treatment 
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who did just that.  Eric Harris, prime mover of the Columbine massacre, seems to have 
seen a number of therapists, one of whom, the psychologist Kevin Albert, refused to 
release his treatment notes to Harris’s parents.  Not long before the massacre, in which 
he aspired to kill hundreds, Harris also completed an anger management class.  “I 
learned the four stages of anger; tension building, verbal escalation, physical escalation 
and opportunity for change.  I believe the most valuable part of this class was thinking 
up ideas for ways to control anger and for ways to release stress in a nonviolent 
manner,” he wrote afterward, no doubt with suppressed rage, in some kind of assigned 
exercise.11   
In January 1997 Kip Kinkel was arrested in Bend, Oregon for throwing rocks  from 
a railroad trestle at the traffic below, hitting one car with what was described as “a fairly 
decent-sized rock.”  Held for one night in a facility in Bend, he was referred to the 
Department of Youth Services in Eugene where a psychologist, taken in by his show of 
contrition, ordered him to perform thirty-two hours of community service, write an 
apology to the driver, and pay $50.00 in damages.  Faith Kinkel, concerned over her 
son’s arrest in Bend as well as his fascination with weapons and bombs, took him to see 
a psychologist, Jeffrey Hicks, in Eugene.  In May 1998 Kinkel executed his father and 
mother, then drove to Thurston High School armed with 1000 rounds of ammunition, 
and shot three students in the head, killing two of them.  The therapist’s last notes on 
Kinkel, dated July 30, 1997, read as follows: 
 
 10 
DATA:  Kip continues to do well.  He is taking Prozac 20 mg. A.M. daily with no 
side-effects.  He does not appear depressed and denies depressive symptoms.  
His mother reports his moods have generally been quite good.  He recently 
returned from a family reunion in San Diego and was very well  behaved and 
seemed to have a good time. 
 
ASSESSMENT: Kip continues to function well with no evidence of depression. 
 
PLAN:  Kip, his mother and I agree he is doing well enough to discontinue 
treatment.12 
 
Although Hicks testified in court that Kinkel brought up his father’s purchase for him of a 
9mm Glock, Hicks made no mention of this at the time in written notes.  Reportedly, the 
therapist told Kinkel that he himself was very pleased his Glocks.13  Those who believe 
psychologists possess a special ability to decode warning signs, amounting to 
prescience, have not considered the Kinkel case.  If the psychologist had perceived signs 
of what was to come some months later, it’s unthinkable that he would have taken the 
gun issue so lightly and recommended cessation of treatment. 
After the massacre of 32 people by Seung-Hui Cho, the Virginia Tech English 
faculty were praised for attempting to coax the withdrawn student into getting 
treatment—as if treatment were the answer.  At the time it was not widely known that 
Cho had already received treatment, a lot of it.  According to the Virginia Tech Review 
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Panel, Cho underwent years of weekly therapy sessions.  His record is crowded with 
therapists, art therapists, counselors, psychiatrists.   
 
After starting with a Korean counselor with whom there was a poor fit, Cho 
began working with another specialist who had special training in art therapy as 
a way of diagnosing and addressing the emotional pain and psychological 
problems of clients. . . .  He modeled houses out of clay, houses that had no 
windows or doors. . . . Cho also had a psychiatrist who participated in the first 
meeting with Cho and his family and periodically over the next few years.  He 
was diagnosed as having [severe] “social anxiety disorder” . . .  Cho was 
evaluated in June 1999 by a psychiatrist at the Center for Multicultural Human 
Services. . . . Cho was fortunate because the intern who was his psychiatrist was 
actually an experienced child psychiatrist who had practiced in South America 
before coming to the United States. . . . The doctor diagnosed Cho with 
“selective mutism” and “major depression: single episode” . . . In the eleventh 
grade Cho’s weekly session at the mental health center came to an end because 
there was a gradual, if slight, improvement over the years and he resisted 
continuing, according to his parents and therapist.14   
 
Following a report by one of his acquaintances that he might be suicidal, Cho was 
ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation on December 13, 2005.  The next day 
doctors concluded that “his insight and judgment are normal.”  Did any of his therapists 
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or evaluators foresee that Cho would one day chain the doors of a classroom building 
and fire more than 170 shots over nine minutes at those trapped within?  Perhaps we 
misplace our hopes in looking to therapeutic expertise for the accurate interpretation of 
signs of future events. 
The case of Maj. Hasan is particularly confounding to the notion that expert 
knowledge of the human mind can prevent acts of violence through early detection, for 
he himself is a psychiatrist. 
 
* 
 
 In an elegy for the victims, one of Cho’s instructors looked retrospectively for 
warning signs of what was to come but found none: 
 
For  
As long as I can think I will wonder if I could have seen 
 
Something in him to ring an alarm and get him treated. 
But I swear on the lives of my children and the family genes 
That he showed nothing but extreme stubborn shy retreat. 
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The search for antecedents of an outburst that seems to come from nowhere has 
become a kind of convention in recent years.  But if we can’t intercept acts of violence 
by early detection, what are we to do?   
We could begin by shifting discussion from what a person might do to what a 
person has done; from the early detection of future disasters to the appropriate 
evaluation of present acts; from therapy to judgment.  There are press reports that Cho 
set fires in his dorm room.  (The Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel notes that 
“Several times when the suitemates came in the room, it smelled as though Cho had 
been burning something.”)  Setting a fire in a dormitory is a manifestly dangerous act, 
quite unlike a sign whose import needs to be interpreted, such as the fashioning of a 
clay house with no windows.  Someone who sets fires in a dormitory should at the very 
least be thrown out of the dormitory.  As for the English faculty at Virginia Tech, the 
question to be asked is not whether they “could have seen / Something in him to ring an 
alarm and get him treated” but why they accepted the trash he submitted for academic 
credit, thereby allowing him to remain a student in good standing.  
Writing in the Chronicle of Higher Education, the lead author of Rampage, an 
investigation of the West Paducah and Jonesboro massacres, spoke for many when she 
praised the English faculty at Virginia Tech: 
 
And here we must take our hats off to the colleagues and students at Virginia 
Tech who did exactly what we would want them to do.  They alerted the 
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counseling staff to the scary writing submitted by the shooter; they tried to 
cajole him into treatment; and they warned the police.15  
 
I can’t tip my hat to the Creative Writing instructor who gave Cho credit for a script that 
read in part: “You wanted me to call you dad?  Okay.  Hey, dad, you are such a asshole!  
Asshole of assholes, DAD!  And as for you banging my mom, looks like that lasted a long 
[sic] as your pathetic career, you prematurely ejaculating piece of dickshit.  Sucks for 
you, you motherfucking McBeef.”16  Blotted out by the Rampage author is the faculty’s 
specifically academic responsibility—one which, if fulfilled, could have seen Cho 
suspended from Virginia Tech instead of being rewarded with academic credit, and in 
the case of a tutorial he took with the chair of the English Department an A, for sinking 
ever deeper into the mire of his fantasies.  The sub-academic nature of outpourings like 
“Richard McBeef” speaks for itself.  It is manifest, glaring, not subtle or inferential like a 
sign.17 
With Kinkel, too, the question to be asked isn’t why everyone failed to see the 
future coming but why so little was done about plainly outrageous acts committed by 
him well before the hour of carnage.  Kinkel was charged with but not prosecuted for 
the felony of throwing rocks at speeding cars (an act written off by the psychologist who 
evaluated him in February 1997 as a “boyish” incident18 and by a feature in the New 
York Times on April 10, 2000 as a “prank”).  Pelting cars at highway speed with rocks 
may or may not have been a sign, but was definitely a crime.  Again, Kinkel smashed the 
windows of a farmer’s tractor with an ax.  A month or so before opening fire in the 
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cafeteria of Thurston High School, he was suspended for karate-kicking a fellow student 
in the head.  Reportedly, he decapitated cats and exhibited their heads to neighborhood 
children, an atrocity that one or another adult must have caught wind of.  It was 
certainly known that he regularly assembled and exploded bombs.  The pity of the 
Kinkel case isn’t that adults overlooked or misread psychological clues of things to come 
but that they, including at least two psychologists, attached so little import to violations 
of the law.  When Kinkel was finally arrested for possession of a stolen gun on school 
property, it was as if his entire history of lies, violence, and lawbreaking caught up with 
him in one moment.  Before he was prosecuted on charges of aggravated murder, not 
one of Kinkel’s violations of the law had ever come to a hearing. 
As to Hasan, the corresponding issue is whether under military law it’s 
permissible for a soldier to fraternize with a known enemy of the United States.  If not, 
Hasan should have been prosecuted.  In any case, it doesn’t seem to make sense to 
interpret his communications with the jihadist in the light of his later actions and to 
blame those who intercepted but saw nothing amiss in these messages for failing to 
discern the shape of the future. 
By concentrating our efforts not on reading the future but on evaluating 
performed acts in the categories appropriate to them (applying academic standards to 
academic acts, legal standards to criminal acts), we avoid getting lost in the fog of clues, 
hints, and signals, and avoid falling into the sort of interpretive excesses that would 
almost necessarily swamp any search for warning signs of things to come.  The best 
warning sign requires a minimum of interpretation.  The strongest warning sign of 
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suicide is that a person has already attempted suicide.  The strongest warning sign of a 
school shooting is talk about carrying one out. 
A literally graphic warning sign appeared on a package delivered in 1992 to the 
mailroom of Simon’s Rock College in Great Barrington, Massachusetts.  Shipped by the 
manufacturer Classic Arms and so labeled,19 the box contained ammunition that was 
duly delivered to the student Wayne Lo, who ran amok with an assault weapon that 
evening, killing two and wounding four.  College authorities had been warned that Lo 
had a gun—illegal on campus—and intended to use it.  Those responsible for putting the 
ammunition in Lo’s hands were guilty, therefore, not of a failure of interpretation but a 
failure of ordinary diligence.  In our concern to decode the subtle warning signs of 
violence, we dare not overlook warnings that are not subtle at all.20 
 
* 
 
Hermeneutics—interpretation—is a tricky business.  The term derives from 
Hermes, messenger of the gods, and himself the god of both thieves and merchants.  
Hermes in short  
 
was . . . both a conveyor of meanings and a transmuter of them, indispensable 
but not wholly trustworthy.  To remember Hermes’ problematic character and 
try to distinguish the cunning and mischievous from the undistorted and 
valuable was essential for any mortal having dealings with him.  Hermeneutic 
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understanding being always probabilistic, always fallible, the possibility of error 
is never absent.21  
 
The duplicity of Hermes is built into the ambiguity of signs themselves—a quality that 
exposes them to the possibility of misreading, all the more in the case of something as 
uncertain and emotive as “warning signs.” 
 Why would we be asked to place our hopes in the interpretation of warning 
signs when such signs tend to disclose themselves only after the fact and when 
interpretation itself is a patently “problematic” activity?  The ambition of defusing 
shocking acts of violence before they occur is dictated by the understandable wish to 
render the world more predictable and less dangerous.  If it were known that Hasan was 
a potential mass murderer, something could have been about him before it was too 
late.  Unfortunately, however, only after a person has committed murder do we know 
that person was a potential murderer. 
The owl of Minerva flies at dusk.  The river of time does not flow backwards.  
History lived—the present experienced in ignorance of the future—looks and feels 
categorically different from history surveyed in retrospect, which is why it would be 
pointless to characterize the obscure fanatic who wrote Mein Kampf as a potential 
Führer even though the ravings of Mein Kampf presage Hitler’s sterilization and 
euthanasia programs and indeed his effort to exterminate an entire people as if it 
constituted “a noxious bacillus.”  Though less time separates Hasan’s exchanges with 
the jihadist and the massacre at Fort Hood, it still seems an abuse of interpretation to 
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say that the psychiatrist whose intercepted messages were deemed innocuous by 
American surveillance in real time had actually revealed himself to be a mass murderer 
in the making.  
Because actions like Hasan’s shake us to our roots and impel us to examine our 
own thinking, it is fitting to recall that law serves and is intended to serve an end much 
like that sought by believers in warning signs—namely, to make the world more stable.  
This simple point is made near the end of Hannah Arendt’s study of totalitarianism, 
inspired as it was by the threat posed by that ideology to all traditions including legal 
ones.  Writes Arendt, 
 
Positive laws in constitutional government are designed to erect boundaries . . . 
between men whose community is continually endangered by the new men born 
into it.  With each new birth, a new beginning is born into the world, a new 
world has potentially come into being. . . . The laws hedge in each new beginning 
and at the same time assure its freedom of movement, the potentiality of 
something entirely new and unpredictable.22  
 
Law, that is, contains threats to the common world we inhabit without suppressing the 
possibility of the new.  A regime that sought to snuff out actions before they occur, 
before they became subject to law at all, would have jettisoned this concept of law.   
Utopias in effect do just this.  Arguably, the essence of utopia is that citizens do 
as their way of life bids them as if it were a prompting of their own nature, without 
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being admonished or commanded.  The original utopia, More’s, is a place of few laws—
not so much because all are left to do as they please as because behavior is so closely 
regulated by surveillance, and citizens so conditioned by their upbringing, that the 
commonwealth can afford to save laws for extreme cases.  Utopia doesn’t seem to have 
laws against theft, for example, the love of wealth having been carefully rooted out of 
citizens beginning in early childhood.  The wish to pluck the seeds of rage from the 
human heart by expert therapy is similarly utopian.   
 Though driven by the hope of reducing risk by timely (“proactive”) intervention, 
the search for warning signs poses risk of its own.  Seeking to extinguish danger in its 
early stages, before it matures into action subject to the law, it invests trust in the 
pseudo-science of interpreting clues—trust better invested in the rule of law itself.   
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